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 1. 
 
What is an ‘organism’? A state of matter, or a particular type of living being chosen as an 
experimental object, like the fruit fly or the roundworm c. elegans, which are ‘model 
organisms’? Organisms are real, in a trivial sense, since flies and Tasmanian tigers and 
Portuguese men-o-war are (or were, in the case of the Tasmanian tiger) as real as tables and 
chairs and planets. But at the same time, they are meaningful constructs, as when we describe 
Hegel or Whitehead as philosophers of organism in the sense that they insist on the 
irreducible properties of wholes – sometimes, living wholes in particular. In addition, the idea 
of organism is sometimes appealed to in a polemical way, as when biologists or philosophers 
angrily oppose a more ‘holistic’ sense of organism to a seemingly cold-hearted, analytic and 
dissective attitude associated with ‘mechanism’ and ‘reductionism’. We murder to dissect, or 
as the famous physicist Niels Bohr warned, we may kill the organism with our too-detailed 
measurements. 
 
Historically, the word ‘organism’ emerged in the late 17th-early 18th centuries, in particular in 
the debate between the philosopher and polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and the chemist 
and physician Georg-Ernest Stahl, the author of a 1708 essay On the difference between 
mechanism and organism. Both Leibniz and Stahl agree that organisms are not the same as 
mere mechanisms, but they differ on how to account for this difference. For Leibniz, it is 
more of a difference in complexity (for him, organisms are machines which are machines 
down to their smallest parts), whereas for Stahl, the organism is a type of whole governed by 
the soul (at all levels of our bodily functioning, from the way I blink if an object comes to 
close to my eyes, to ‘my’ fighting off an infection, to fully involuntary processes like 
digestion). After this one doesn’t find the term much used in our sense until the late 18th 
century. It occurs rarely in the Enlightenment (people spoke more of ‘organised bodies’ or 
‘organisation’); thus Kant’s insistence, in his third Critique, on the unique kind of purposive 
arrangement found in organisms, uses the language of ‘organised bodies’. 
 
A curious feature about the notion of organism is that it is located from the outset at the 
intersection of philosophical inquiry into the nature of living beings (Leibniz, Kant like 
Aristotle before them) and properly biological reflection. For this is also the period when 
biology as a science is emerging. Some of the motivation was a reaction to the popularity of 
the notion of machine. The mechanical philosophy of the 17th century – Boyle, Hobbes, 
Descartes but also attempts in medicine to study bodies and body parts as if they were 
mechanical – rested on the notion that natural phenomena result from interactions between 
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material particles governed by the laws of mechanics. This enabled the formulation of laws of 
motion and the invention of particular mechanisms, the latter allowing one to explain 
particular phenomena. One thinks of the popularity of clockwork metaphors, but also of actual 
automata, designed to replicate the functioning of animals (as in the case of Vaucanson’s 
duck). 
 
Aside from the classic philosophers mentioned above, philosophers in the 20th century have 
had a certain interest in the concept of organism. Originally, the interest came especially from 
phenomenologically motivated authors such as Kurt Goldstein, Hans Jonas, and on the other 
side of the Rhine, Henri Bergson and Gilbert Simondon. (Whitehead is hard to fit in a neat 
conceptual box here.). In biology, for a long time with the rise of genetics and popular 
concepts such as the ‘selfish gene’, the organism was viewed as consigned to the dustbin of 
history. Any privileged status granted to irreducible wholes will disappear – on this view – in 
favor of the molecularization of biological entities. Thus the journal American Zoologist 
asked in 1989, “Do organisms exist?”, and described the organism as the ‘Phoenix’ of 
biology. As the distinguished philosopher of biology David Hull put it, “both scientists and 
philosophers take ontological reduction for granted… Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and 
that is that.” Yet the story does not end there. Biologists interested in evolution, but also 
developmental processes, ecosystems, and problem cases such as coral reefs or symbiotic 
organisms, have begun to ask questions again concerning the nature of biological identity and 
individuality, which as a side effect brings back in a role for philosophy. Perhaps it is a false 
or empty promise to insist that the world is made up of atoms or genes and replicators, and 
nothing else; perhaps we should speak, with the biologists Queller and Strassman, of ‘degrees 
of organismality’. 
 
2. 
 
The degree of reality of the concept of organism, then, is bound up with a variety of other 
issues. One is the status of biology and biological entities with regard to physics: how do we 
decide what gets to be ‘the most real’ sorts of entities? Another is the role for philosophy. For 
there is a kind of symbiotic – or is it parasitical? – relationship between the metaphysician 
looking to examples from the biological world to support her claims about identity, and the 
biologist appealing to metaphysical notions to differentiate the ‘systems’ she studies from 
atoms, or machines, or numbers. Thirdly, the more ideological implications of the organism 
concept tie it directly to what sort of position we take on the relation between humanity and 
scientific explanations. 
 
Let’s distinguish between strong and weak conceptions of organism, where the weak 
conception simply holds that organisms are types of organisation with some specific features, 
like homeostasis, which are not found in storms or supernovas, whereas the strong conception 
insists on a real, irreducible uniqueness of organisms and challenges our entire scientific 
world-picture on the basis thereof. Thus the defender of the ‘strong concept’ of organism, not 
content to assert like Heidegger that “science does not think” and end it there, will try and 
shift the conflict into the territory of science itself, within science itself, and will say that there 
should be a science of the organism itself, a holistic science, a ‘new paradigm’, which would 
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overcome or refute the excessively reductionist paradigm we have been saddled with since the 
Scientific Revolution. 
 
The problem with all of this, whether or not one accepts the verdict of ‘mainstream science’ 
that the organism in itself either does not exist or does not matter, is that this kind of defense 
or challenge has something very normative about it. It is in the name of a certain idea of value 
that one defends a particularity of living beings; think of the expression ‘pro-life’! To those 
who insist that there is something about life, the fact of life, and the unique features of living 
beings which almost prior to argument is a value, I would reply with Nietzsche’s comment 
that “Life is not an argument. Among the conditions of life might be error,” a comment which 
harks back to old Epicurean themes (the world is composed of atoms and chance) but which 
can also be heard in Darwinian terms: the fact that one species rather than other survived has a 
dimension of ‘accident’ to it. 
 
I suggest that a useful concept of organism, if we are to have one – a concept of organism 
worth wanting, in Daniel Dennett’s phrase – will have to be compatible with a broad 
commitment to philosophical naturalism. That is, it will not seek to oppose organisms to the 
rest of physical nature, neither in terms of their possessing a mysterious inner life which other 
beings do not possess, nor because they possess a mysterious ‘vital force’. In some sense, as 
the great 18th-century French naturalist Buffon wrote, “the organic is the most ordinary 
product of nature.” Of course, if we push that notion of ordinariness too far, we lose sight of 
an interesting feature of organisms, including ourselves: that they live in their own 
environments. Lizards, finches, tarantulas, primates and humans all live in, interact with, and 
customize their environments which we can describe as meaningful (think e.g. of the bower 
bird): they are worlds. 
 
Rather than arguing over what is most real – atoms and protons, or hearts and lungs – it could 
be interesting to take account of the way in which organisms relate to the meaningful traits of 
their environment (this is partly discussed by biologists as ‘niche construction’), since it is 
also our own doing. 
 
 3. 
 
Rather than asserting that ‘organisms are special because of their special relation between 
whole and parts’ (as in Aristotle’s arresting image that a hand severed from the body is no 
longer a hand), or more empirically, ‘organisms are special because they digest, sweat, fear, 
love, have high blood pressure or low blood sugar’ (a claim partly weakened by artificial 
constructions from Vaucanson’s duck to Wim Delvoye’s ‘Cloaca’), we would better off 
acknowledging that there is always an imaginative, and even a fictional component in our 
attempts to make sense of organisms. Even the most die-hard mechanists make use of 
analogies and models to understand that most complex of machines, the living body. A 
mechanical model is nothing else than a heuristic model designed to explain something about 
the object which ‘strong organicists’ seek a monopoly on, Life. 
 
When Kant (in?)famously declared that there will never be a Newton of even a mere blade of 
grass – that is, that science, which he understood as mathematically specifiable mechanistic 
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science, could never account for or ‘discover’ the laws governing organic beings – or when 
Leibniz insisted that the difference between a ‘machine of nature’ (his term for an organism) 
and an artificial machine is that a machine of nature, a living being, is a machine to infinity, 
they are both clinging to the idea of a certain special ‘something’, whether that be ‘wonder 
tissue’ or ‘selfhood’, which constructions and reconstructions cannot grasp. 
 
In contrast, we should recall that an important dimension of mechanical models is their 
heuristic dimension: mechanisms are also ‘built so as to see what is inside them’. If organisms 
are particular, complex cases of mechanisms, this does not amount to the rather knee-jerk 
reductionist insistence that ‘Life’ does not exist, or that there are only atoms or genes. 
 
Let me put this point differently, and draw out some of its implications. First, organisms are 
not free from our acts of imaginative construction. Second, there is no absolute separation 
between organisms and mechanisms, or organisms and the physical world as a whole. Third, 
if our desire to preserve the uniqueness of flesh-and-blood, living, breathing, suffering and/or 
joyous entities over and against an imagined cold, dead, inert Necropolis takes the form of a 
list of irreducible empirical features, we are not on the right track. For one thing, we do not 
have any absolute, empirical or conceptual criterion with which we could distinguish a living 
being from a non-living being, whether the integrity of the organism, its self-regulation 
(homeostasis), or ‘metabolism’. These features are always post facto observations, starting 
from within a temporal process. In that sense, the relation between living and non-living, 
organism and machine, is an empirical relation, which does not allow one to posit qualitative 
differences between laws of nature. As the theoretical biologist Robert Rosen says, “there is 
as yet no list of tests, characteristics or criteria we can apply to a given material system that 
can decide whether that system is an organism or not”; “the decision as to whether a given 
system is an organism is entirely a subjective, intuitive one, based on criteria that have so far 
resisted formalization.” 
 
Any strong claims about the reality of organisms will be based on (a) heuristic fiction(s)! The 
latter phrase is meant to convey, also, that organisms are a cognitive construct of our minds: 
in order to be able to understand an entity we need to project certain features onto it; but these 
features should not be held to be constitutive of certain ‘regions’ of the real. Those of us who 
are fond of Darwinian flourishes would add that it may be a survival trait to be able to ‘read’ 
certain organisms as organisms rather than as bundles of molecules. Thus, in an evocative 
example suggested by Dennett, if I am being pursued by a tiger in a jungle, it is a better idea 
for me to view that tiger as an organism – as a total, interconnected system of parts with 
unified functions and goals, including ‘eating me’ – rather than as a set of atoms or molecules 
which I try to calculate the laws of: if I view it in the latter way, the chances of my making it 
out alive are much reduced. Thus, seeing the world, or at least parts of the world, from an 
organismic standpoint would be a competitive advantage. 
 
4. 
 
The category of ‘organism’ has returned, if not to centre stage then at least to the horizon of 
the active interests of biologists – whether they are concerned with evolution, ecosystems, 
systems biology, physiology, developmental processes and the like – and philosophers 
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concerned either with what the life sciences tell us about some of our fundamental 
preoccupations, and/or with classic metaphysical problems like individuality and personal 
identity. In what sense I am ‘one’ with the bacteria in my gut? In what sense is a coral reef 
one organism, or colony individuals like the Portuguese man-o-war, or symbiotic cases like 
the squid which ingests phosphorescent bacteria so that it can hunt at night, rendered invisible 
by the luminescence on its back?  
 
The other question I have discussed, concerning, not the individuality of organisms but their 
reality – what is different, or special about them as compared to machines, or physical Nature 
as a whole, including as it pertains to the old ‘what is Life?’ question (where the difference is 
more, ‘a living body versus a corpse’) – has faded away, in comparison with that of 
individuality. But if such a question were asked, we might say that the organism is nothing 
other than the production of a vital artificiality or fiction; and it is never alone: an organism 
can only be a ‘paradigmatic individual’ in and through its relation to a population, a group or 
an environment as a whole. If there is nothing unique about organisms over and against the 
rest of Nature; if, as Buffon thought, “the organic is the most ordinary product of nature,” 
what does exist is a certain approach to reality, a fiction, the way a particular bundle of living 
matter exists, feels joy and regret, remembers, ages and thereby briefly saturates a particular 
intersection in the great causal nexus of the world. 
 
 
 
